Edward Snowden Knows and Says Apple Just Declared War on Your Privacy

The All-Seeing “i”: Apple Just Declared War on Your Privacy

“Under His Eye,” she says. The right farewell. “Under His Eye,” I reply, and she gives a little nod.

Edward Snowden

This new offensive is tentatively slated to begin with the launch of iOS 15⁠—almost certainly in mid-September⁠—with the devices of its US user-base designated as the initial targets. We’re told that other countries will be spared, but not for long.

You might have noticed that I haven’t mentioned which problem it is that Apple is purporting to solve. Why? Because it doesn’t matter.

Having read thousands upon thousands of remarks on this growing scandal, it has become clear to me that many understand it doesn’t matter, but few if any have been willing to actually say it. Speaking candidly, if that’s still allowed, that’s the way it always goes when someone of institutional significance launches a campaign to defend an indefensible intrusion into our private spaces. They make a mad dash to the supposed high ground, from which they speak in low, solemn tones about their moral mission before fervently invoking the dread spectre of the Four Horsemen of the Infopocalypse, warning that only a dubious amulet—or suspicious software update—can save us from the most threatening members of our species. <snip>

Snowden is using Substack!
Email Subscription Platform Substack Adds Bitcoin Lightning Payments

EFF Tell Apple: Don’t Scan Our Phones | EFF Action Center

NYM Building the next generation of privacy infrastructure

Existing internet protocols leak sensitive data that can be used without users knowledge — Nym is developing the infrastructure to prevent this data leakage by protecting every packet’s metadata at the network and application layers.
Run Nym Nodes

Privacy Startup Nym Hires Whistleblower Chelsea Manning to Audit Mixnet

Manning has joined privacy startup Nym as a security consultant.

 

T-Mobile, Apple, Blackberry are disgusting surveillance tools

Philip Agre predicted the dark side of the Internet 30 years ago. Why did no one listen?

Philip Agre, a computer scientist turned humanities professor, was prescient about many of the ways technology would impact the world https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/08/12/philip-agre-ai-disappeared/

1996

Early 90’s Philip Agre reviewed my site, giving it a thumbs up and encouraged my work. This was published on the Educational CyberPlayGround, Inc. http://www.edu-cyberpg.com

Phil Agre: How to Help Someone Use A Computer. 1996
https://edu-cyberpg.com/Technology/Agre.html

THE DARK SIDE

#T-Mobile, #Apple, #Blackberry are disgusting surveillance tools

Engadget: T-Mobile confirms data breach affects over 47 million people.

As part of its ongoing data breach investigation, T-Mobile has confirmed the enormity of the stolen information. Roughly 47.8 million current and former or prospective customers have been affected by the cyberattack on its systems, the carrier confirmed on Wednesday. Of that number, about 7.8 million are current T-Mobile postpaid accounts and the rest are prior or potential users who had applied for credit, the company added in a press release.
https://www.engadget.com/t-mobile-data-breach-affected-people-103104868.html

T-Mobile Investigating Claims of Massive Customer Data Breach
Hackers selling the data are claiming it affects 100 million users.
https://www.vice.com/en/article/akg8wg/tmobile-investigating-customer-data-breach-100-million

The T-Mobile Data Breach Is One You Can’t Ignore
Hackers claim to have obtained the data of 100 million people—including sensitive personal information.
https://www.wired.com/story/t-mobile-hack-data-phishing/

INCEL

Nazi, Proud Boy, Oath Keepers, Boogaloo, Trump, KKK, Hate

The main social networks, the ‘incel’ community remains as influential as it was in 2014, when an English 22-year-old killed seven people on the streets of Isla Vista, California, motivated by his hatred of women.”
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/aug/16/social-networks-struggle-to-crack-down-on-incel-movement

AI

Researchers fooled AI into ignoring stop signs using a cheap projector. “A trio of researchers at Purdue today published pre-print research demonstrating a novel adversarial attack against computer vision systems that can make an AI see – or not see – whatever the attacker wants.
https://thenextweb.com/news/researchers-tricked-ai-ignoring-stop-signs-using-cheap-projector

How GrayShift Keeps its iPhone Unlocking Tech Secret
Copies of non-disclosure and other agreements obtained by Motherboard show the kind of information that iPhone unlocker Grayshift tells police to keep secret. https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7e498/how-grayshift-keeps-its-iphone-unlocking-tech-secret

APPLE IS NOW A DISGUSTING PHONE

Is Apple’s NeuralMatch searching for abuse, or for people?

Apple stunned the tech industry on Thursday by announcing that the next version of iOS and macOS will contain a neural network to scan photos for sex abuse. Each photo will get an encrypted ‘safety voucher’ saying whether or not it’s suspect, and if more than about ten suspect photos are backed up to iCloud, then a clever cryptographic scheme will unlock the keys used to encrypt them. Apple staff or contractors can then look at the suspect photos and report them.

Apple’s child protection features spark concern within its own ranks

Apple’s device surveillance plan is a threat to user privacy — and press freedom
https://freedom.press/news/apples-device-surveillance-plan-is-a-threat-to-user-privacy-and-press-freedom/

Apple is now scanning your phone before anything gets to their server. It does not matter if you put it in the Icloud they also do this without internet using meshnet.

iPhone Neural Hash –  SHOCKING AI Tech

We built a system like Apple’s to flag child sexual abuse material — and concluded the tech was dangerous

An employee reconditions an iPhone in Sainte-Luce-sur-Loire, France, on Jan. 26. (Loic Venance/AFP/Getty Images)
Earlier this month, Apple unveiled <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/apple-to-scan-us-phones-for-images-of-child-abuse/2021/08/05/e6c968ac-f61f-11eb-a636-18cac59a98dc_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_4> a system that would scan iPhone and iPad photos for child sexual abuse material (CSAM). The announcement sparked a civil liberties <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/apples-plan-think-different-about-encryption-opens-backdoor-your-private-life> firestorm <https://cdt.org/insights/international-coalition-calls-on-apple-to-abandon-plan-to-build-surveillance-capabilities-into-iphones-ipads-and-other-products/>, and Apple’s own employees have been expressing alarm <https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-apples-child-protection-features-spark-concern-within-its-own-ranks-2021-08-12/>. The company insists reservations about the system are rooted in “misunderstandings <https://9to5mac.com/2021/08/06/apple-internal-memo-icloud-photo-scanning-concerns/>.” We disagree.

We wrote the only peer-reviewed publication on how to build a system like Apple’s <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/13/apple-csam-child-safety-tool-hashing-privacy/?itid=lk_inline_manual_5> — and we concluded the technology was dangerous. We’re not concerned because we misunderstand how Apple’s system works. The problem is, we understand exactly how it works.

Our research project <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/kulshrestha> began two years ago, as an experimental system to identify CSAM in end-to-end-encrypted online services. As security researchers, we know the value of end-to-end encryption, which protects data from third-party access. But we’re also horrified that CSAM is proliferating on encrypted platforms. And we worry online services are reluctant to use encryption without additional tools to combat CSAM.

We sought to explore a possible middle ground, where online services could identify harmful content while otherwise preserving end-to-end encryption. The concept was straightforward: If someone shared material that matched a database of known harmful content, the service would be alerted. If a person shared innocent content, the service would learn nothing. People couldn’t read the database or learn whether content matched, since that information could reveal law enforcement methods and help criminals evade detection.

Knowledgeable observers argued a system like ours was far <https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2019/12/08/on-client-side-media-scanning/> from feasible <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/11/why-adding-client-side-scanning-breaks-end-end-encryption>. After many false starts, we built a working prototype. But we encountered a glaring problem.

Our system could be easily repurposed for surveillance and censorship. The design wasn’t restricted to a specific category of content; a service could simply swap in any content-matching database, and the person using that service would be none the wiser.

A foreign government could, for example, compel a service to out people sharing disfavored political speech. That’s no hypothetical: WeChat, the popular Chinese messaging app, already uses content matching to identify dissident material <https://citizenlab.ca/2018/08/cant-picture-this-an-analysis-of-image-filtering-on-wechat-moments/>. India enacted rules this year <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/07/indias-draconian-rules-internet-platforms-threaten-user-privacy-and-undermine> that could require pre-screening content critical of government policy. Russia recently fined Google <https://www.reuters.com/technology/russia-fines-google-4-mln-roubles-failing-delete-content-tass-2021-05-25/>, Facebook <https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-technology-government-and-politics-cea2b0203f13a2e6e17951f2eb570a31> and Twitter <https://apnews.com/article/media-moscow-social-media-europe-russia-cc0f314ee9e77811a81d15095c2dce18> for not removing pro-democracy protest materials.

We spotted other shortcomings. The content-matching process could have false positives, and malicious users could game the system to subject innocent users to scrutiny.

We were so disturbed that we took a step we hadn’t seen before in computer science literature: We warned against our own system design, urging further research on how to mitigate the serious downsides. We’d planned to discuss paths forward at an academic conference this month.

That dialogue never happened. The week before our presentation, Apple announced <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/> it would deploy its nearly identical system on iCloud Photos, which exists on more than 1.5 billion devices <https://financialpost.com/technology/apple-tops-wall-street-expectations-on-record-iphone-revenue-china-sales-surge>. Apple’s motivation, like ours, was to protect children. And its system was technically more efficient and capable than ours. But we were baffled to see that Apple had few answers for the hard questions we’d surfaced.

China is Apple’s second-largest market <https://www.theverge.com/2015/4/27/8505063/china-is-now-apples-second-biggest-market>, with probably hundreds of millions of devices. What stops the Chinese government from demanding Apple scan those devices for pro-democracy materials? Absolutely nothing, except Apple’s solemn promise. This is the same Apple that blocked <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/07/31/apple-is-pulling-vpns-from-the-chinese-app-store-heres-what-that-means/?itid=lk_inline_manual_20> Chinese citizens from apps that allow access to censored material <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/holes-close-in-chinas-great-firewall-as-apple-amazon-snub-apps-to-bypass-censors/2017/08/02/77750f38-7766-11e7-803f-a6c989606ac7_story.html>, that acceded to China’s demand to store user data in state-owned data centers <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/technology/apple-china-censorship-data.html> and whose chief executive infamously declared <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/holes-close-in-chinas-great-firewall-as-apple-amazon-snub-apps-to-bypass-censors/2017/08/02/77750f38-7766-11e7-803f-a6c989606ac7_story.html>, “We follow the law wherever we do business.”

Apple’s muted response about possible misuse is especially puzzling because it’s a high-profile flip-flop. After the 2015 terrorist attack <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/12/05/fbi-investigating-san-bernardino-shooting-as-an-act-of-terrorism/> in San Bernardino, Calif., the Justice Department tried to compel <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/12/02/one-year-after-san-bernardino-police-offer-a-possible-motive-as-questions-still-linger/> Apple to facilitate access to a perpetrator’s encrypted iPhone. Apple refused, swearing in court filings that if it were to build such a capability once, all bets were off about how that capability might be used in future.

“It’s something we believe is too dangerous to do,” Apple explained <https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/answers/>. “The only way to guarantee that such a powerful tool isn’t abused … is to never create it.” That worry is just as applicable to Apple’s new system.

Apple has also dodged on the problems of false positives and malicious gaming, sharing few details about how its content matching works.

The company’s latest defense <https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-executive-defends-tools-to-fight-child-porn-acknowledges-privacy-backlash-11628859600> of its system is that there are technical safeguards against misuse, which outsiders can independently audit. But Apple has a record <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/08/16/apple-corellium-child-porn-iphone/> of obstructing security research. And its vague proposal <https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Security_Threat_Model_Review_of_Apple_Child_Safety_Features.pdf> for verifying the content-matching database would flunk an introductory security course.

Apple could implement stronger technical protections, providing public proof that its content-matching database originated with child-safety groups. We’ve already designed a protocol <https://twitter.com/jonathanmayer/status/1426540534517182464> it could deploy. Our conclusion, though, is that many downside risks probably don’t have technical solutions.

Apple is making a bet that it can limit its system to certain content in certain countries, despite immense government pressures. We hope it succeeds in both protecting children and affirming incentives for broader adoption of encryption. But make no mistake that Apple is gambling with security, privacy and free speech worldwide.

Apple drops intellectual property lawsuit against maker of security tools – Reed Albergotti
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/08/10/apple-drops-corellium-lawsuit/

Apple settled its federal lawsuit Tuesday against Corellium, the maker of tools that allow security researchers to find software flaws in iPhones, according to court records.

BlackBerry resisted announcing major flaw in software powering cars, hospital equipment

https://www.politico.com/news/2021/08/17/blackberry-qnx-vulnerability-hackers-505649

BlackBerry resisted announcing major flaw in software powering cars, hospital equipment
The former smartphone maker turned software firm resisted announcing a major vulnerability until after federal officials stepped in.
By BETSY WOODRUFF SWAN and ERIC GELLER
08/17/2021 02:42 PM EDT

A flaw in software made by BlackBerry has left two hundred million cars, along with critical hospital and factory equipment, vulnerable to hackers — and the company opted to keep it secret for months.

On Tuesday, BlackBerry announced that old but still widely used versions of one of its flagship products, an operating system called QNX, contain a vulnerability that could let hackers cripple devices that use it. But other companies affected by the same flaw, dubbed BadAlloc, went public with that news in May.

Two people familiar with discussions between BlackBerry and federal cybersecurity officials, including one government employee, say the company initially denied that BadAlloc impacted its products at all and later resisted making a public announcement, even though it couldn’t identify all of the customers using the software.

The back-and-forth between BlackBerry and the government highlights a major difficulty in fending off cyberattacks on increasingly internet-connected devices ranging from robotic vacuum cleaners to wastewater-plant management systems. When companies such as BlackBerry sell their software to equipment manufacturers, they rarely provide detailed records of the code that goes into the software — leaving hardware makers, their customers and the government in the dark about where the biggest risks lie.

BlackBerry may be best known for making old-school smartphones beloved for their manual keyboards, but in recent years it has become a major supplier of software for industrial equipment, including QNX, which powers everything from factory machinery and medical devices to rail equipment and components on the International Space Station. BadAlloc could give hackers a backdoor into many of these devices, allowing bad actors to commandeer them or disrupt their operations.

Microsoft security researchers announced in April that they’d discovered the vulnerability and found it in a number of companies’ operating systems and software. In May, many of those companies worked with the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to publicly reveal the flaws and urge users to patch their devices.

BlackBerry wasn’t among them.

Privately, BlackBerry representatives told CISA earlier this year that they didn’t believe BadAlloc had impacted their products, even though CISA had concluded that it did, according to the two people, both of whom spoke anonymously because they were not authorized to discuss the matter publicly. Over the last few months, CISA pushed BlackBerry to accept the bad news, eventually getting them to acknowledge the vulnerability existed.

Then BlackBerry said it didn’t intend to go public to deal with the problem. The company told CISA it planned to reach out privately to its direct customers and warn them about the QNX issue.

Technology companies sometimes prefer private vulnerability disclosures because doing so doesn’t tip off hackers that patching is underway — but also because it limits (or at least delays) any resulting public backlash and financial losses.

But that outreach would only cover a fraction of the affected companies, because BlackBerry also told CISA that it couldn’t identify everyone using its software in order to warn them.

That’s because BlackBerry licenses QNX to “original equipment manufacturers,” which in turn use it to build products and devices for their customers, just as Microsoft sells its Windows operating system to HP, Dell and other computer makers. BlackBerry told the government it doesn’t know where its software ends up, and the people using it don’t know where it came from. Its known customers are a comparatively small group.

“Their initial thought was that they were going to do a private advisory,” said a CISA employee. Over time, though, BlackBerry “realized that there was more benefit to being public.”

The agency produced a PowerPoint presentation, which POLITICO reviewed, stressing that many BlackBerry customers wouldn’t know about the danger unless the federal government or the original equipment manufacturers told them. CISA even cited potential risks to national security and noted that the Defense Department had been involved in finding an acceptable timing for BlackBerry’s announcement.

CISA argued that BlackBerry’s planned approach would leave out many users who could be in real danger. A few weeks ago, BlackBerry agreed to issue a public announcement. On Tuesday, the company published an alert about the vulnerability and urged customers to upgrade their devices to the latest QNX version. CISA issued its own alert as well.

In a statement to POLITICO, BlackBerry did not deny that it initially resisted a public announcement. The company said it maintains “lists of our customers and have actively communicated to those customers regarding this issue.”

“Software patching communications occur directly to our customers,” the company said. “However, we will make adjustments to this process in order to best serve our customers.”

QNX “is used in a wide range of products whose compromise could result in a malicious actor gaining control of highly-sensitive systems,” Eric Goldstein, the head of CISA’s cyber division, said. “While we are not aware of any active exploitation, we encourage users of QNX to review the advisory BlackBerry put out today and implement mitigation measures, including patching systems as quickly as possible.”

Goldstein declined to address CISA’s conversations with BlackBerry but said the agency “works regularly with companies and researchers to disclose vulnerabilities in a timely and responsible manner so that users can take steps to protect their systems.”

Asked about whether the company originally believed QNX was unaffected, Blackberry said its initial investigation into affected software “identified several versions that were affected, but that list of impacted software was incomplete.”

BlackBerry is hardly the first company to disclose a bug in widely used industrial software, and cybersecurity experts say such flaws are to be expected occasionally in highly complex systems. But resolving the QNX problem will be a major task for BlackBerry and the government.

In a June announcement about QNX’s integration into 195 million vehicles, BlackBerry called the operating system “key to the future of the automotive industry” because it provides “a safe, reliable, and secure foundation” for autonomous vehicles. BlackBerry bragged that QNX was the embedded software of choice of 23 of the top 25 electric vehicle makers.

The QNX vulnerability also has the Biden administration scrambling to prevent major fallout. Vulnerabilities in this code could have significant ripple effects across industries — from automotive to health care — that rely heavily on the software. In some cases, upgrading this software will require taking affected devices offline, which could jeopardize business operations.

“By compromising one critical system, [hackers] can potentially hit thousands of actors down that line globally,” said William Loomis, an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative. “This is a really clear example of a good return on investment for those actors, which is what makes these attacks so valuable for them.”

After analyzing the industries where QNX was most prevalent, CISA worked with those industries’ regulators to understand the “major players” and warn them to patch the vulnerability, the agency employee said.

Goldstein confirmed that CISA “coordinated with federal agencies overseeing the highest risk sectors to understand the significance of this vulnerability and the importance of remediating it.”

CISA also planned to brief foreign governments about the risks, according to the PowerPoint presentation.

BlackBerry is far from unique in knowing little about what happens to its products after it sells them to its customers, but for industrial software like QNX, that supply-chain blindness can create national security risks.

“Software supply chain security is one of America’s greatest vulnerabilities,” said Andy Keiser, a former top House Intelligence Committee staffer. “As one of the most connected societies on the planet, we remain one of the most vulnerable.”

But rather than expecting vendors to identify all of their customers, security experts say, companies should publish lists of the types of the code included in their software, so customers can check to see if they’re using code that has been found to be vulnerable.

“BlackBerry cannot possibly fully understand the impact of a vulnerability in all cases,” said David Wheeler, a George Mason University computer science professor and director of open source supply chain security at the Linux Foundation, the group that supports the development of the Linux operating system. “We need to focus on helping people understand the software components within their systems, and help them update in a more timely way.”

For years, the Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration has been convening industry representatives to develop the foundation for this kind of digital ingredient list, known as a “software bill of materials.” In July, NTIA published guidance on the minimum elements needed for an SBOM, following a directive from President Joe Biden’s cybersecurity executive order.

Armed with an SBOM, a car maker or medical device manufacturer that learned of a software issue such as the QNX breach could quickly check to see if any of its products were affected.

SBOMs wouldn’t prevent hackers from discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities, and the lists alone cannot tell companies whether a particular flaw actually poses a risk to their particular systems. But these ingredient labels can dramatically speed up the process of patching flaws, especially for companies that have no idea what software undergirds their products.

“Buying software is only the start of the transaction. It is not the end,” said Trey Herr, director of the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative.

“It’s not a new problem,” Herr added. “It’s not a problem that’s going away, and what we are doing right now is insufficient for the scale of that problem.”

You’ve Never Heard of the Biggest Digital Media Company in America
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/15/business/media/red-ventures-digital-media.html

THE THOUGHT POLICE ARE HERE
Florida Sheriff’s Office Now Notifying People It Will Be Inflicting Its Pre-Crime Program On Them
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210724/15223647236/florida-sheriffs-office-now-notifying-people-it-will-be-inflicting-pre-crime-program-them.shtml

COVID-19, privacy, and school recordings by Becky Richards

K12, Ed TECH, Superintendents, Parents

PRIVACY RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN

Dear Becky,

K12 Students Privacy rights across the nation need you help. Wish you would direct someone to take on the K12 Department of Education.

THERE ARE NO CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICERS IN K-12 EDUCATION

The big biz of spying on little kids

Google’s Apps for Education contracts with schools suffer from gaping student privacy protection loopholes. School Administrators signed a contract that does NOT protect their students from data collection for the ultimate purposes of monetization as Google represents.

ETHICS — There isn’t a single school district with a K-12 CPO.
In fact, it is still extremely rare for districts to hire even one full-time employee dedicated to privacy.

Student Privacy Bill Protection : No Parental Consent Needed for Data Mining

The Journal Report: Parents Mostly Clueless About Student Data Privacy Laws

Data broker tried to sell personal info on a million kids but didn’t tell state officials.

Where is your state “STUDENT DATA TRANSPARENCY AND SECURITY ACT”.

Who is senior-level official who is responsible for the organization’s privacy policies and data governance in your school district?

Teachers and School Districts MUST follow the law and protect children’s privacy!!!

Statewide Longitudinal Data Systems, or SLDS.
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/slds/
That marked the entrance of big data into education, enabled by the leaps forward in the ability to store and process information on remote servers “in the cloud.”

Rebecca “Becky” Richards 

first civil liberties and privacy officer (CLPO).
NSA Civil Liberties and Privacy Director — BIO PDF

COVID-19, privacy, and school recordings

by Becky Richards

Imagine being the school administrator when you realize that one of your student’s parents is in charge of privacy at the NSA and isn’t happy with your video recording policies for remote learning.

https://iapp.org/about/person/0011a00000DlQcSAAV

Rebecca “Becky” Richards joined the National Security Agency as its first Director of Civil Liberties and Privacy in February 2014. Her primary job is to provide expert advice to the Director and oversee NSA’s civil liberties and privacy activities. She is also responsible for developing measures to further strengthen NSA’s privacy and civil liberties protection.

There had been a short discussion of recording classes followed by an even shorter discussion of the fact that the school is in a two-party consent state. So I didn’t think much more of the discussion until this consent to record showed up quietly the Friday of Labor Day weekend, taunting me, poking at me, gnawing at me and eventually just outright leading me to the outrage that someone thought it was a good idea to write a legally compliant consent that had a threat at the end.

So, I decided to apply my day job as the civil liberties and privacy officer at the U.S. National Security Agency to my parenting job. Though not something I had expected, it seemed to me this was an important teachable moment for the school and kids about how to make thoughtful choices for privacy, civil liberties and teaching.

There may be times particularly with older children or adults during which recording the sessions makes sense, but when we are working with K-8 that needs are necessarily different. So I started a conversation with my school and refused to sign the consent.

I expressed concerns that the consent was very broad and protective of the institution but had no protections in place for the children. There were no stated controls on who would use the recordings or why they were being done beyond operational uses and instances when a child was having a one-on-one conversation with a teacher and no parent was available.

Classes were not recorded when they were in person, so why should they be now? Just because you can, does not mean you should. If there was a benefit to this, why did not we do it earlier during in-person classes?

What are the benefits of recording a class? Are they available for students and parents at a later date, if the material wasn’t understood, more review was needed or a child was out of class? Perhaps they are available for administration to review to improve teaching and/or provide feedback on the teaching or accountability for one-on-one meetings between the child and the teacher.

What are the risks of recording a class? Children may be less willing to participate, children become acclimated to always being recorded (or surveilled), a misstep in class is now caught on camera and available for all to see rather than it being a one-time misstep. Without proper access controls, those not normally in the class could access the sessions and take teaching and interactions out of context. These are “windows” into families’ private lives, into our homes, and potentially capturing others collaterally having nothing to do with the school. If it was just the teacher and audio of the students, that would be less intrusive but still concerning.

And alas, I always have to ask, “Is it muted?” Which is concerning, given I’m asking an 11-year-old if it is OK to talk in my own house. What precedent are we setting for our children for acceptable behavior?

While cellphones, cameras and recordings seem to be pervasive, they are not the full solution to concerns with what is happening in a school, class or society. They are one piece of the puzzle, and we need to treat them as such.

I appreciate that perhaps there wasn’t time to think through how these videos will be used, but it is incumbent upon the school to have this all thought through before starting the recordings. So I decided to provide them input on how they could use this policy as an opportunity to build trust through civil liberties and privacy protections and be more transparent.  

Here are some of the examples of improved civil liberties and privacy protections I offered, which you may find helpful if you are finding that your kids’ classes are being recorded:

  • Videos are available for a shorter time (say one week) so that children in the class can review them in case they missed the class.
  • Only families who have children in the class can view the videos rather than the entire school.
  • If there is a one-on-one meeting with a child, perhaps this is recorded and then, upon review by the family, is deleted rather than being kept for long periods of time.
  • No recordings should be done for religious activities.
  • Clearly written notices describing the practices that will be taking place.

The school has been listening since I approached them and were very quick to respond that their intention wasn’t to record everything or surveil the students, but none of that was in the policy — it only protected the school and told parents that we couldn’t use the recordings for any purposes at all.

After a lengthy discussion with the school, they agreed to issue a policy that teachers will only record themselves, no student interactions; one-on-one interactions without a parent will be recorded and retained for seven days, and the parent will be asked to review to ensure there is no concerning behavior; no religious activities will be recorded; any recordings of parent meeting will start with a notification that the event is being recorded, and individuals should turn off their cameras if they do not wish to be recorded. This creates good civil liberties and privacy protections and transparency about the policy for all.

As we concluded the call, our head of school noted she appreciated the conversation and the outcome, but this was not anything covered in her training to be a teacher or school administrator.

It seems like it is time to start adding these to the curriculum for everyone.

Rebecca Richards is the director of civil liberties and privacy at the U.S. National Security Agency.

 

IAPP @PrivacyPros
We are the #IAPP, your global #privacy community & resource. Tweets generated from the IAPP social media team. For breaking news, follow

Portsmouth, NH iapp.org

Rebecca Richards, CIPP/G, CIPP/US

U.S. National Security Agency
Director, Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency Office